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RECENT DECISIONS
out looking to see whether the trust is thereby violated) amounts to bad
faith. Pollard v. Tobin, supra. The latter holding does not seem justifiable when
it is considered that the bonds themselves stated that the deed affected the rights
of the holders and the terms and conditions of issuance. This seems more than
mere knowledge of the existence of the deed. It is a warning sufficient to put
the prospective holder on inquiry. Marine National Exchange Bank et al. v.
Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co. et al., 702 F. (2d) 815 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934) (emphasizing
fact that reference on bond states a named trustee) ; King Cattle Co. v. Joseph,
supra (the Minnesota court, confronted with a similar set of facts and involv-
ing the construction of an identical statute [Mason's Minn. Stats, (1927) §
7099], as in the Pollard case, decided that a prospective holder was put on in-
quiry and that failure so to do constituted bad faith).
HENRY G. SCHROEDER.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-PoWER TO CONVERT TO FEDERAL CHARTER.
-Pursuant to the provisions of the Home Owner's Loan Act, 48 Stat. 645, § §
5, 6, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (i), three state building and loan associations made ap-
plication to the Federal Home Loan Bank for conveision into federal savings
and loan associations. An attempt by the Banking Commission, to prevent these
conversions, was enjoined. One of the'associations was accepted, was granted a
charter, and has since operated as a federal association. The other two have not
yet converted. The Banking Commission brings this original action for construc-
tioh of its powers, seeks to have the conversion of the one association declared
void, and asks for an injunction preventing the proposed conversions of the other
two. The issue being identical, all cases were tried together. Held, such conver-
sions, without authority of charter or state consent, are void; and the relief
sought by the plaintiff was granted. Cleary, State ex rel. v. Hopkins St. Building
& Loan Ass'n. (Wis. 1934) 257 N.W. 684.
The charter of a corporation may not be revised or repealed by the creating
state if such act withdraws or violates the obligations of the charter. Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819). The states evaded the
rule of the Dartmouth College case by inserting in their constitutions a clause
reserving full power and control over corporations created under their laws.
Wis. Const. art. XI, § 1; see West Wisconsin Ry. Co. v. Board of Supervisors
of Trempealeau County, 35 Wis. 257, 270 (1874) ; Attorney General v. Railroad
Companies, 35 Wis. 425, 574 (1874). This power to control and regulate domestic
corporations has been recognized by federal and state courts. Sherman v. Snmith,
1 Black 587, 17 L.Ed. 163 (1862) ; Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wallace 190,
20 L.Ed. 550 (1871); see Attorney General v. Railroad Companies, supra. This
power, not to be abused, must be exercised only in the protection of state, cor-
porate, and individual rights. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S.
700, 719, 25 L.Ed. 496, 498 (1878) ; Miller v. State, 15 Wallace 478, 498, 21 L.Ed.
98, 104 (1872). By virtue of the charter a contractual relationship arises between
the state, the corporation, and the stockholders; such relationship imposing upon
the state a duty to protect the rights of stockholders. See Martin Orchard Co.
v. Fruit Growers' C. Co., 203 Wis. 97, 102, 233 N.W. 603, 607 (1930). A funda-
mental or radical change in the purpose of a corporation cannot be accomplished
over the dissent of a single stockholder. Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412, 105 N.W.
1031 (1906) (a conversion by a mutual insurance company into a stock company
was held invalid). Could a federal act give state building and loan associations
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unhampered power to convert? In the instant case the court declares that were
the federal act construed to give state building and loan associations unrestricted
power to convert it would result in a violation of the rights of stockholders and
an unauthorized invasion of state rights. However the court, by construing the
federal act as permissive only was not required to answer this question.
It is suggested that this act confers power of conversion as does the national
banking act. State banks may convert without the consent of the state. Casey v.
Galli, 94 U.S. 673, 24 L.Ed. 168 (1876). The court holds that this federal power
applies only to banks; that building and loan associations are not banks. Can it
be said that the functions of these two types of corporations are so different, or
the control of the state so absolute, as to deny application of this federal power?
Is the conversion a sufficiently radical change in the functions and purposes of
the corporation to constitute a violation of the rights of stockholders? The build-
ing and loan associations are seeking a review.of the case before the United
States Supreme Court.
RICHARD B. JOHNs.
INSURANCE-PRESUMPTION OF DEATH AFTER SEVEN YEARS ABSENcE-DILIGENT
SEARcH.-Plaintiff beneficiary brought an action on three insurance policies is-
sued by the defendant and showed that the insured, her husband, disappeared on
his way to work and has not been heard from for over seven years prior to the
commencement of this action. The insured had lived in domestic tranquility with
his wife, was not a wanderer, and followed an almost invariable daily routine.
After ascertaining that the insured did not appear for work on the day of his
disappearance, the plaintiff made no inquiry at police headquarters but wrote
letters to the insured's mother and sister and received no reply. The defendant
appeals from a judgment awarding the plaintiff the face value of the policies
and also the premiums paid since the day of the insured's disappearance on the
ground that there was no showing of diligent search to discover the death or
whereabouts of the insured. Held, the evidence is sufficient to establish the infer-
ence that the insured died on the day of his disappearance; death will be
presumed without a showing of a diligent search. Delaney v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., (Wis. 1934) 257 N.W. 140.
The first case in Wisconsin on this point involved the presumption of death
of one absent for twenty-one years, Cowan v. Lindsay, 30 Wis. 586 (1872), and
Greenleaf's rule that seven years absence without tidings shifts the burden of
proof to the party contesting the presumption was regarded as sufficient author-
ity. The inference in the Cowan case, supra, that diligent search by the party
seeking to establish the presumption is not necessary was followed for some time.
Miller v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 140 Wis. 505, 122 N.W. 1126,
133 Am. St. Rep. 1095, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 178, (1909) ; Page v. Modern Woodmen
of America, 162 Wis. 259, 156 N.W. 137, L.R.A. 1916F 438 (1916); Ewing v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 299, 210 N.W. 819 (1926). Following Green-
leaf's broad statement of the rule led the court into error in the Ewing case, supra,
where seven years absence without tidings established death even though the in-
sured left under circumstances indicating that the plaintiff would never hear
from her again. The unreasonableness of the holding was recognized in Hansen
v. Central Verein, etc., 198 Wis. 140, 223 N.W. 571, 64 A.L.R. 1284 (1929) and
the rule was qualified by holding that the circumstances attending the absentee's
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